CLAIM: The United States forced Russia to invade Ukraine.
CONCLUSION: The claim that the United States provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is baseless and forms part of a pro-Russian narrative that does not hold up under the scrutiny of historical facts and international conditions.
There was no commitment against NATO expansion. Contrary to the claims, there was no binding agreement prohibiting NATO’s eastward enlargement. The countries that joined did so sovereignly and of their own volition.
Russia itself had guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity through the Budapest Memorandum and other agreements, which it violated with the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the invasion (2022).
The Euromaidan was not a coup. Despite efforts to portray it as an American conspiracy, the ousting of Yanukovych was the result of massive popular protests against corruption and his decision to reject an EU agreement in favor of Russia.
The narrative that Moscow had no aggressive intentions does not hold, as it had already annexed Crimea in 2014 and supported separatists in Donbas, while Putin’s statements about “historical Russia” suggest different motives.
The AEGIS missile defense system is not a threat. The bases in Poland and Romania were designed to counter threats from the Middle East, not for aggressive actions against Russia.
The Minsk Agreements were not honored by Russia. Moscow repeatedly violated them, continuing to militarily support the separatists.
In conclusion, the Russian invasion was a choice made by Moscow, part of a broader strategy to exert influence over former Soviet republics. The attempt to shift blame to the United States is part of a propaganda narrative that overlooks the facts.
This claim was presented in a video by Cypriot MEP Fidias Panayiotou, who cites Jeffrey Sachs to argue that the United States forced Russia to invade Ukraine.
Jeffrey Sachs is an American economist, academic, and author known for his work on economic development, poverty reduction, and sustainable development. He has served as director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and is a Professor of Sustainable Development at the same institution. In recent years, Sachs has faced criticism for his views on geopolitical issues, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He has adopted positions seen as sympathetic to Russia and has promoted narratives aligned with Russian propaganda, sparking reactions in the international community. Sachs has shifted in recent years from his traditional economic analysis to a pro-Russian stance on the war in Ukraine, which has damaged his credibility. In this case, he argues that the U.S. bears responsibility for the invasion, claiming that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russia’s reaction.
Speaking to Fidias Panayiotou within the European Parliament, Sachs referenced certain historical events to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which, according to him, was carried out to keep NATO and the U.S. away from Russia’s borders.
Initially, he referred to assurances from the U.S. and the West in general about not expanding NATO eastward. As he claims, these assurances were given in 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union.
– He mentions a decision under President Bill Clinton in 1994 to expand NATO.
– He refers to the deployment of “AEGIS missile systems” in Poland and Romania.
– He talks about the election of the “neutral” Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine in 2010.
– He continues by saying that Russia had no expansionist ambitions against Ukraine and only sought a 25-year lease of the naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea.
– He also mentioned the Euromaidan, a revolution that took place in 2013-2014, and the ousting of Yanukovych, which he claims was done with U.S. assistance.
– He cites the phone conversation between Victoria Nuland and then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt as the “best evidence” of American involvement.
– He then refers to the Minsk Agreements (specifically Minsk II), which would have granted autonomy to Donbas but were not respected by Ukraine and the U.S.
– Finally, he points to the U.S. desire to place missiles in Ukraine in 2021-2022. He concludes that the purpose of the invasion was to impose a neutrality regime on Ukraine.
Sachs’ assertions are oversimplified and lack substance. For this reason, each claim must be examined separately.
U.S. and Western assurances against NATO eastward expansion
The alleged violation of a Western commitment not to expand NATO has long been a key element in Putin’s narrative against the Alliance, but more recently against Ukraine as well. Specifically, two notable instances where he mentioned this supposed violation were in his speech in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference and in a speech on March 18, 2014, in which he attempted to justify the seizure of Crimea.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a divided Germany and the four powers that had occupied it during World War II discussed whether the country should Reunify. The treaty they signed in 1990 (the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, also known as the “Two Plus Four Treaty”) extended NATO into East Germany, which had been assigned to the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. To appease the Soviets, it also granted the area a “special military status” that precluded the stationing of foreign NATO forces there.
The Treaty was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and the four Allied powers that occupied Germany at the end of World War II in Europe. The Treaty did not include any reference to the issue of NATO expansion. In the discussions leading up to the Treaty, the Soviets never raised the issue of NATO enlargement, except in relation to the former East Germany. Regarding that territory, it was agreed that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, German forces under NATO could be deployed there, but foreign NATO forces and nuclear weapons systems could not. There was no commitment to refrain from future NATO expansion eastward.
The Treaty, and specifically Article 5, said nothing about the possibility or impossibility of NATO expanding eastward, a process that began with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as members in 1999. Subsequent agreements, such as the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, considered a cornerstone of relations between the two sides, also made no reference to prohibiting eastward expansion. The Founding Act was signed at the Madrid Summit in 1997, alongside invitations for enlargement to other countries that had previously been in the Soviet sphere of influence. Given that the second official agreement of the post-Cold War era between Russia and NATO confirms that “NATO and Russia do not see each other as adversaries” and that NATO’s transformation is “a process that will continue,” it is clear that NATO’s enlargement was not considered a primary security concern for Russia.
The most significant “assurance” came during a meeting on February 9, 1990, between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev, with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze present. After explaining why the U.S. wanted a unified Germany in NATO, Baker told Gorbachev that “if we maintain a presence in a Germany that is part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO forces’ jurisdiction eastward, not an inch.”
“I put the following question to [Gorbachev],” Baker wrote in a letter to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. “Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and without U.S. forces, or would you prefer a united Germany tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?”
These comments (made before the collapse of the USSR), along with similar remarks from Baker’s European allies like Genscher and Helmut Kohl, were part of what researchers at the National Security Archive at George Washington University called a “cascade of assurances” offered to the Soviets. Genscher would later state: “This [i.e., NATO’s eastward expansion] was never the subject of negotiations and certainly not a result of negotiation.”
At that time (1990-91), NATO also did not commit to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact regarding their potential future accession to the Alliance. This is evident from a series of statements made by NATO and U.S. officials, according to which this issue was not on the agenda.
In April 2009, speaking to Bild, Gorbachev expressed anger over NATO’s expansion, speaking of broken promises. However, in 2014, he said the issue of NATO expansion had never been raised. “I say this with full responsibility,” he stated. He added that the eventual expansion was “a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990.” He also noted that when the issue resurfaced in the early 1990s, “Russia initially had no objection.”
NATO’s official position is as follows:
“No such agreement was ever made. NATO’s door has been open to new members since its founding in 1949, and that has never changed. This ‘Open Door Policy’ is enshrined in Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty, which states that ‘any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area’ may apply for membership. Decisions on membership are made by consensus among all Allies. No treaty signed by the United States, Europe, and Russia included provisions on NATO membership.”
Declassified White House documents also reveal that, in 1997, Bill Clinton firmly rejected Boris Yeltsin’s offer of a “gentlemen’s agreement” that no former Soviet republics would join NATO: “I cannot make commitments on behalf of NATO, and I am not in a position to veto NATO expansion with respect to any country, let alone allow you or anyone else to do so… NATO operates by consensus.”
Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote in a September 1993 letter to then-U.S. President Bill Clinton: “Any possible integration of Eastern European countries into NATO would not automatically lead the alliance to turn against Russia in some way.” Yeltsin expressed concern about such a development, citing Baker’s words, but clarified that former Warsaw Pact countries have the sovereign right to chart their defense path as they wish, including choosing to join any political-military alliance. He also did not rule out Russia’s potential NATO membership, though he said it was theoretical. Another noteworthy point in the letter is where Yeltsin states that while he does not perceive NATO as a threat to Russia, the reaction of public opinion, the opposition, and moderate circles in his country must be taken into account.
Clinton opted to develop a new NATO initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would be open to both former Warsaw Pact countries and other non-European nations. This proposal was presented to Yeltsin, who immediately accepted it. NATO launched the PFP at its annual summit in January 1994, and more than 20 countries, including Russia and Ukraine, joined in the following months. By 1996, Clinton openly supported NATO expansion, and in 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members. Clinton did not commit to NATO not expanding. On the contrary, his administration was preparing for enlargement while simultaneously trying to manage Russia’s reactions.
In 2002, following the decision to admit the Baltic states into NATO, Vladimir Putin, while expressing skepticism about NATO expansion, insisted it was “no tragedy.” Putin continued to oppose NATO enlargement, especially after returning to the presidency in 2012, alongside the radicalization of his domestic policies.
As the Council on Foreign Relations has noted, the Russian government under Putin remained wary of NATO expansion during the 2000s. Putin expressed doubts that the Alliance, which expanded in 2004, would be effective in addressing the security challenges of that era, including combating international terrorism and the conflict in Afghanistan. However, many new members, particularly the Baltic states, saw NATO membership as a shield against Moscow.
In the years that followed, Putin voiced even stronger displeasure about NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe. In his 2007 Munich speech, he noted that “It is obvious that NATO expansion has no relation to the modernization of the Alliance or to ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”
In 2004, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych of the pro-Russian Party of Regions won the presidential election. Shortly afterward, Ukraine’s Supreme Court ruled that widespread fraud had occurred, a finding corroborated by reports from various domestic and foreign observers. The results sparked public outrage, with popular support rallying behind opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko. Mass protests ensued, known historically as the “Orange Revolution,” lasting from late November 2004 to January 2005. During those months, Yushchenko suddenly fell gravely ill, and after multiple tests, it was determined he had been poisoned with TCDD dioxin. Yushchenko accused Ukraine’s security services of the assassination attempt, also alleging Russian involvement. Subsequent elections brought Yushchenko to power as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as interim prime minister.
Yanukovych returned to power in 2006 as prime minister in the Alliance of National Unity under Yushchenko until early elections in September 2007 reinstated Tymoshenko as prime minister. During Yushchenko’s tenure, relations with Russia reached a crisis point due to his efforts to improve ties with the European Union.
Yanukovych was narrowly re-elected president in 2010. In 2013, Viktor Yanukovych suspended the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, opting instead for closer ties with Russia.
Viktor Yanukovych was Ukraine’s pro-Russian president from 2010 to 2014 and, as previously mentioned, was ousted during the Euromaidan protests after rejecting the EU Association Agreement in favor of stronger ties with Russia. His presidency was marked by corruption, authoritarian tendencies, and the suppression of protesters, leading to bloody clashes in Kyiv. As support waned, he fled to Russia in February 2014, and Ukraine’s parliament removed him from office. His ousting was followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In 2019, a Ukrainian court sentenced him in absentia for high treason after he had requested Russian military intervention. He remains in exile in Russia, occasionally appearing in pro-government Russian media.
In 2014, the war in Donbas followed, with support for the “separatists” in eastern Ukraine in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and the Euromaidan movement a few months earlier. These events were followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
The Euromaidan revolution set the stage for Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the war in Donbas the following month, with the “separatists” receiving substantial Russian backing.
The Euromaidan revolution (Euro Square) escalated into violent clashes between protesters and police, resulting in hundreds of deaths. On February 21, 2014, Yanukovych abandoned Ukraine and sought refuge in Russia. Oleksandr Turchynov assumed the duties of acting president until June 7, 2014. Elections held on May 25 were won by Petro Poroshenko, who took office on June 7, 2014, and remained in power until 2019.
The war between Russia and Ukraine, which began in 2014 with events in Crimea and Donbas, peaked on November 25, 2018, when three Ukrainian Navy vessels—two gunboats and a tugboat—were captured near the Kerch Strait, with the main justification being the violation of “Russia’s territorial waters.” Russian authorities blocked the passage of the Ukrainian vessels by placing a large cargo ship under the Kerch Strait bridge, barring entry to the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian vessels anchored off the strait, and eight hours later, they began their return journey to Odesa. After being pursued and fired upon by the Russian Coast Guard, they were captured along with their crews in international waters off Crimea. International condemnation of Russian aggression followed, and the three ships were returned to Ukraine on November 18, 2019. This was the first time Ukraine and Russia directly exchanged fire in their ongoing confrontation.
In 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected to power, an ardent supporter of Euromaidan, who from the outset made no secret of his ambition to integrate Ukraine into the European Union and NATO. In a December 2018 interview, Zelenskyy stated that as president, he would seek to end the war in Donbas through negotiations with Russia, while describing the leaders of Luhansk and Donetsk as Kremlin puppets. He did not hide his intent to reintegrate the breakaway regions into Ukraine, adding that Crimea could only be returned if the regime in Russia changed.
The “missile system” AEGIS in Poland and Romania
These are AEGIS Ashore missile defense systems in Poland and Romania, part of NATO’s missile shield, designed primarily to counter ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region, with a particular focus on Iran. However, Russia strongly opposes these installations, viewing them as a threat to its strategic security. In reality, they can launch SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) interceptor missiles, designed for anti-ballistic defense against medium-range missiles, not intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Thus, they are not offensive weapons.
With the completion of the Poland installation, what the U.S., through NATO, had announced as the “European Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) under the Obama administration in 2009 is being realized. This is a combination of air defense elements on land and sea to protect European airspace from ballistic attacks. The network consists of the two fully operational AEGIS Ashore sites in Poland and Romania, a long-range radar (AN/TPY-2) in Kurecik, Turkey, a command center in Germany, and the stationing of four U.S. Arleigh Burke destroyers in Rota, Spain, which contribute their own missiles as a second line of defense.
Minsk Agreements (2014-2015)
The Minsk I and II agreements were diplomatic efforts to end the war in Donbas, where pro-Russian separatists fought Ukrainian forces following the annexation of Crimea. The first agreement, signed in September 2014, collapsed quickly. The second, reached in February 2015 with mediation from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine (with support but not direct involvement from the U.S.), aimed for a ceasefire, decentralization of power in Donbas, and restoration of Ukrainian border control, contingent on elections and constitutional reforms.
Neither side fully adhered to Minsk II. Ukraine refused to grant autonomy to Donbas without first regaining border control, fearing it would legitimize the separatists. Russia and the separatists, meanwhile, refused to relinquish border control before political reforms were implemented and repeatedly violated the ceasefire, with over 20,000 violations recorded by the OSCE by 2021. Moreover, Russia continued to arm the separatists, with evidence showing the transfer of troops and equipment despite Russian denials.
The United States was not a party to the Minsk agreements but supported Ukraine’s position, initially providing non-lethal aid (e.g., radars) in 2015 and later weapons (e.g., Javelin anti-tank missiles) from 2017 under the Trump administration. Russia accused the West of undermining the agreements by arming Kyiv and not pressing for political reforms. In his February 21, 2022, speech, Putin claimed Ukraine’s failure to implement Minsk justified recognizing Donetsk and Luhansk as independent, paving the way for the invasion.
The phone conversation between Victoria Nuland, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, and Geoffrey Pyatt, then U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
The phone call, apparently intercepted by Russian intelligence, concerns political developments in Ukraine during the anti-government Maidan protests and before the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych. It became public days before Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia, where he remains.
Discussion about the composition of the new Ukrainian government: Nuland and Pyatt discussed candidates who could join a new government with U.S. support. Nuland stated that Arseniy Yatsenyuk was the right person to become prime minister, downplaying the roles of Klitschko and Tyahnybok, other opposition leaders.
Nuland expressed frustration with the European Union’s role in the Ukraine crisis, saying “F* the EU.” This phrase sparked strong reactions and diplomatic unease, as it appeared to show U.S. contempt for the EU. The conversation was seen as evidence that the U.S. played an active role in Yanukovych’s ousting, a claim Russia used to argue that the West orchestrated a coup in Ukraine. The U.S. did not deny the conversation’s authenticity, but Nuland apologized for her remark about the EU.
The Nuland-Pyatt conversation proves that American officials sought to influence Ukraine’s post-Yanukovych government, capitalizing on the Euromaidan chaos to promote pro-Western figures like Yatsenyuk. However, it does not prove that the U.S. orchestrated Yanukovych’s ousting. There is no indication, either in the conversation or elsewhere, that the U.S. initiated, funded, or directed the protests that toppled Yanukovych. It was a Ukrainian movement rooted in domestic grievances. The conversation reflects opportunistic intervention, not a planned coup. Thus, it is not evidence of a U.S.-led coup. The claim exaggerates the recording’s significance and distorts the uprising’s origins.
All they wanted was a 25-year lease of the naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea
After Ukraine’s independence in 1991, Russia sought to retain its strategic naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, leading to negotiations with Ukraine, which had inherited the region. After tense talks in the early 1990s over the division of the Soviet fleet, Russia formally leased Sevastopol under the 1997 Partition Treaty for 20 years until 2017, paying $97.75 million annually (partly through debt forgiveness). This was accompanied by the Friendship Treaty, where Russia recognized Ukraine’s borders.
In 2010, under pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, the Kharkiv Pact extended the lease until 2042 in exchange for a 30% discount on Russian natural gas prices. However, the deal sparked domestic outrage in Ukraine over sovereignty concerns.
These agreements, driven by persistent Russian demands, remained in effect until 2014, when, following the Euromaidan uprising and Yanukovych’s ousting, Russia annexed Crimea, unilaterally canceling the lease and claiming Sevastopol as its own, violating prior treaties but ending any need for negotiations with Ukraine. Thus, Russia didn’t merely seek a lease—it secured and extended it through formal agreements before resorting to annexation. The cancellation of the prior treaties was signed by Vladimir Putin.
Russia’s guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial integrity
Russia guaranteed but ultimately failed to uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity through several key agreements. In the Budapest Memorandum, Russia, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, pledged to respect Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine relinquishing its nuclear arsenal. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Ukraine inherited a significant number of nuclear weapons. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership (1997) affirmed the inviolability of borders between Russia and Ukraine, recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The Minsk Agreements (2014 & 2015) aimed to end hostilities in eastern Ukraine, with Russia committing to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite these commitments, Russia violated all these agreements with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the broader invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
U.S. missiles in Ukraine?
In late 2021, Russia accused NATO of planning to deploy missiles in Ukraine. This claim was unsupported by any NATO policy or U.S. statement. U.S. and NATO officials repeatedly stated that Ukraine was not being considered for missile deployments. Putin’s demand in December 2021 for a legally binding agreement that NATO would never deploy weapons in Ukraine was rejected, as NATO maintains an open-door policy for sovereign countries. The claim that the U.S. planned to install missiles in Ukraine is a Russian propaganda talking point, not a reality. The U.S. has supplied Ukraine with missile systems, notably the short range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which have been used to target Russian military positions, including those within Russian territory, after the Russian invasion. The system is operated by Ukrainian troops.
Conclusions
The claim that the United States provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is baseless and part of a pro-Russian narrative that does not withstand scrutiny of historical facts and international conditions.
There was no commitment against NATO expansion. Contrary to claims, no binding agreement prohibited NATO’s eastward enlargement. The countries that joined did so sovereignly and willingly.
Russia itself guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity through the Budapest Memorandum and other agreements, which it breached with the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the invasion (2022).
The Euromaidan was not a coup. Despite attempts to portray it as an American conspiracy, Yanukovych’s ousting resulted from massive popular protests against corruption and his rejection of an EU deal in favor of Russia.
The narrative that Moscow had no aggressive intentions is untenable, as it had already annexed Crimea in 2014 and supported Donbas separatists, while Putin’s “historical Russia” rhetoric reveals different motives.
The AEGIS missile defense system is not a threat: The bases in Poland and Romania were designed to counter Middle Eastern threats, not for aggression against Russia.
The Minsk Agreements were not upheld by Russia: Moscow repeatedly violated them, continuing to militarily back separatists.
In conclusion, the Russian invasion was Moscow’s choice, part of a broader strategy to influence former Soviet republics. The attempt to shift blame to the U.S. is part of a propaganda narrative that disregards the facts.
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